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Abstract. When information or control in a multiagent system is private to the
agents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed out-
come, in order to change the resulting end state of such a system to their benefit.
In some domains this may result in an execution failure. We show that in such
settings VCG mechanisms lose truthfulness, and that the utility of truthful agents
can become negative when using VCG payments (i.e., VCG is not strongly indi-
vidually rational). To deal with this problem, we introduce an extended payment
structure which takes into account the actual execution of the promised outcome.
We show that this extended mechanism can guarantee a nonnegative utility and
is (i) incentive compatible in a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) incentive compatible in
dominant strategies if and only if all agents can be verified during execution.
1 Introduction
A multiagent system often involves a set of self-interested agents, which may manip-
ulate the system by mis-reporting their private information. Research into mechanism
design is about creating incentives for such self-interested agents to report the correct
information. Such a mechanism usually consists of (i) a social choice function, which
selects a socially optimal outcome given the declaration of agents; and (ii) a set of pay-
ments, which decide for each agent how much it pays (or receives) to (or from) the
mechanism. Unfortunately, the outcome selected by a mechanism may fail to execute
for two main reasons: agents may have mis-reported some capabilities, but they are not
able to deliver on these promises during execution, or they may simply refuse to execute
(part of) their tasks. Rational agents act in such a way if they can profit from it.
Most existing work in mechanism design assumes that, although misreports may
lead to sub-optimal outcomes, the outcome selected by the mechanism is always attain-
able, and that the agents indeed are willing to do their part in the execution. However,
there are many settings in which an outcome cannot be enforced. For example in multia-
gent planning domains, scheduling domains with precedences, and all kinds of domains
where agents need to declare capacities or capabilities, the information that agents give
directly influences the set of feasible outcomes. Moreover, in almost any domain the
refusal of an agent to execute its part leads to a (partial) failure. In such settings we
want to create incentives for the agents in order to make sure that any selected outcome
is attained.
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For example, consider a multiagent planning problem (MAP) [5, 12], which is con-
cerned with planning by and for a group of (self-interested) agents. Such a MAP con-
tains a private, individual planning problem for each agent. A typical individual plan-
ning problem of agent i includes a set of operations (with some costs attached, and a
pre- and post-condition) that i can perform, a set of goals (with reward values), and the
current state of this agent. The solution of a MAP is a plan: a partially ordered sequence
of actions that, when executed successfully, results in a set of achieved goals for some
of the agents. The utility of a plan is defined as the difference between the total reward
of the achieved goals and the total cost of the actions used. The mechanism design prob-
lem of MAP is, given all agents’ declared private planning problems, to determine the
plan that has the highest utility as well as the payments of all agents.
Example 1. As a simple example of a multiagent planning problem, let there be two
agents. Agent 1 has a goal which is to complete task t1. Completing t1 requires op-
erations (also called actions) a1 and a2 for which we also have a precedence relation
a1 ≺ a2 (i.e., a1 has to be executed before a2). Agent 1 itself is able to perform only
action a1, with cost c1(a1) = 8. The reward of achieving t1 is 10. Agent 2 does not
have any goal, but can execute action a2 with cost c2(a2) = 1. The optimal plan ω for
this planning problem is to execute a1 and then a2 such that the goal t1 can be obtained.
The utility of this plan is 10− 8− 1 = 1.
However, if either agent 1 or agent 2 refuses to execute its action, the plan ω will
fail to be attained. This situation is highly undesirable.
A basic mechanism design model does not consider the actual execution on the out-
come. So, the payment phase is always before the execution. Therefore, one may won-
der whether a simple solution to such unsuccessful executions in the example could
be handing over payments after the selected plan has been executed. Unfortunately, it
is not just a matter of having the payment phase before or after the execution. In this
example, using the VCG mechanism1, the payments of agent 1 and agent 2 are 1 (pay-
ing to the mechanism) and −2 (receiving from the mechanism), respectively. Hence,
the plan may fail in each case: (i) in the case of payment up-front, agent 2 will leave
before executing, directly after it receives money from the mechanism; (ii) in the case
of payment afterwards, agent 1 may leave before the payment phase to save money by
not paying.
In this paper we deal with this problem by asking agents for a deposit before ex-
ecution. In addition, we also generalize an idea put forward by Nisan and Ronen [9].
Their idea was to take advantage of the actual execution to gain more information about
the private information of the agents. They distinguish between two phases in a mecha-
nism: a declaration phase where agents declare their private information, and an execu-
tion phase where agents actually execute the agreed outcome. Their mechanism verifies
the agents’ declarations during the execution phase, and awards payments agents after
execution. Their approach relies on the following two assumptions: (1) all declared in-
formation of the agents in the selected outcome can be verified during execution, and
(2) the payments of the agents can be guaranteed. They show that the proposed mech-
1 We will describe the VCG mechanism in Section 3.
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anism, called mechanism with verification, is truthful for a task scheduling problem, as
any agent’s real execution time can be measured in the exectued schedule.
Unfortunately, without the first assumption, this mechanism can not guarantee any
properties on truthfulness or individual rationality. Moreover, these two assumptions are
not always realistic. First of all, in most multiagent applications, due to their highly dis-
tributed nature, it is very difficult or even impossible to verify the declared information
of the agents during execution. Secondly, as we already mentioned after Example 1, a
lying agent may just walk away without bothering with the payment. It is not always
possible that the mechanism can enforce the payments of the agents after execution.
Hence, in this paper, we relax these two assumptions. We characterize the problem
domains where the approach in [9] is feasible, and we present a mechanism where
truthtelling leads to a Nash equilibrium without any condition on verification.
Our main contributions thus are that we show that for settings where the execution
of agents may fail,
– the VCG mechanism is not truthful nor strongly individually rational (in Section 3),
– an extension of the VCG mechanism with a more complex payment structure is
both truthful and strongly individually rational if and only if the execution can be
verified (Section 4), and
– such a mechanism is both strongly individually rational and incentive compatible
in Nash (Section 4).
In this paper we restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms with payments, as these
usually give a good indication of the (im)possibilities of other variants (because of
the revelation principle and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [6]). To arrive at these
results, we first introduce some notation and we define different misreporting types
(over- and under-reporting) formally (in Section 2).
2 Notation and Definitions
Let the type, i.e., the private information, of each agent i ∈ N be denoted by θi. We let
Θi be the allowable subset of types for each i ∈ N , and let Θ denote Θ1× · · · ×Θn. A
type profile θ is a vector (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ associating each agent with a type. A direct-
revelation mechanism M defines a function g : Θ → Ω, which outputs outcomes given
types Θ.
Since in some settings not all outcomes in Ω are feasible given a true type profile θ,
i.e. executable given θ, we assume that in each domain there is a function F : Θ → 2Ω
which defines the set of all feasible outcomes given the (true) preference profile θ. Note
however, that when another profile θˆ is given, with θˆ 6= θ, then typically F (θˆ) does
not represent feasible outcomes, but only the hypothetically feasible outcomes in case
θ = θˆ. We use this fact to define over-reporting and under-reporting.
If for agent i the set of (hypothetically) feasible outcomes given θˆi is not contained
in the true set of feasible outcomes (given θi), either because the agent is lying, or it
just is not going to execute its part, we say that agent i over-reports.
Definition 1. Given a preference profile θ, an agent over-reports its declared type θˆi,
iff F (θˆ) ⊃ F (θ).
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For example, if agent 1 in Example 1 declares it can also execute action a2 (which it
cannot), we say that agent 1 is over-reporting. In addition, we also say that agent 2
is over-reporting if agent 2 declares its action a2 but refuses to execute it later during
execution.
Conversely, if agent 1 declares it cannot do any of the actions, the set of feasible
outcomes given such a declaration θˆi is strictly contained in the true set of feasible
outcomes (given θi). In such a case we say that agent i under-reports.
Definition 2. Given a preference profile θ, an agent under-reports its declared type θˆi,
iff F (θˆ) ⊂ F (θ).
Besides over- and under-reporting we of course also consider traditional lying sce-
narios where declaring a type θˆ 6= θ does not influence the set of feasible outcomes, i.e.,
where F (θˆ) = F (θ). Notice that under-reporting can be considered as a special case in
traditional lying, by declaring a cost of∞ for the parts that an agent does not want to
execute.
The preferences of an agent i with type θi are defined by the valuation function
vi(ω, θi) which assigns a value to each outcome ω ∈ Ω. However, in case an outcome
is infeasible, the actual valuation is only defined on the state of the world after the
execution has failed. One can think of this as there being some function e : Ω × Θ →
Ω that given the true types of all agents and an outcome selected by a mechanism,
returns the outcome that is really achieved. Obviously, if no agent is lying, then for any
outcome ω selected by a mechanism, it holds that e(ω, θ) = ω. In this paper, we thus
use vi(e(ω, θ), θi) to denote the actual valuation of agent i on a selected outcome ω.
Our goal in this paper is to design direct mechanisms where it is each agent’s domi-
nant strategy to declare its true type. Following existing literature, we call such mecha-
nisms incentive compatible in dominant strategies, or simply truthful. We approach our
goal by first discussing truthfulness separately for three types of misreporting: tradi-
tional lying, over-, and under-reporting, and then extending the discussions to any mixed
type of misreporting. We use θ−i to denote the type profile (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θN ).
Definition 3. A mechanism is truthful with respect to over-reporting iff for any agent
i with type θi that is over-reporting with θˆi, for any true or over-reporting type profile
θˆ−i, the outcome e
(
g(θˆi, θˆ−i), θ
)
is strictly more preferred by i than g(θi, θˆ−i).
Definition 4. A mechanism is truthful with respect to under-reporting iff for any agent i
with type θi that is under-reporting with θˆi, for any true or under-reporting type profile
θˆ−i, the outcome e
(
g
(
θˆi, θˆ−i, θ
))
is strictly more preferred by i than g(θi, θˆ−i).
Truthfulness for traditional lying is defined in the usual way [8]. A mechanism is
truthful if it is truthful with respect to any kind of misreporting.
Definition 5. A mechanism is truthful iff for any agent i with type θˆi 6= θi, given
any type profile θˆ−i, the outcome e
(
g(θˆi, θˆ−i), θ
)
is strictly more preferred by i than
g(θi, θˆ−i).
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Given that the only truthful mechanisms for unrestricted domains without payments
are dictatorships (by Gibbard and Satterthwaite [6]), we study mechanisms with pay-
ments. We introduce a payment function pi : Θ → R for each agent i to specify the
amount that imust pay. As usual, the goal of mechanism design is then to find a mecha-
nism (g, p1, . . . pn) such that g(θ) returns an optimal outcome that maximizes the social
welfare. The social welfare is defined as the total valuation of the agents on the outcome
ω = g(θ), i.e., v(ω, θ) =
∑
i∈N vi(ω, θi). The utility of an agent i on the outcome ω is
defined by: ui(ω, θi) = vi(e(ω, θ), θi) − pi(θ). A rational agent tries to maximize this
utility.
3 VCG revisited
We are interested in developing mechanisms which are able to prevent any type of mis-
reporting. For this, we start by studying one of the most successful truthful mechanisms,
and in some settings even the only one, called VCG [3, 7, 13].
Definition 6. A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (g, p1, . . . , pn) is composed
of two elements: a social choice function g, and an n-tuple of payments p1, . . . , pn,
where
– g(θ) ∈ argmaxω∈F (θ) v (ω, θ), where v(ω, θ) =
∑
i vi(ω, θi), i.e., g maximizes
social welfare;
– for any functions h1, . . . , hn : Θn−1 → R, for all types θ = (θ1, . . . , θn), the
payments are defined by pi(θ) = hi (θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i vj (g(θ), θ).
A basic VCG mechanism works as follows.
1. The mechanism asks the agents to declare their types θi.
2. The mechanism finds an outcome using function g, and computes for each agent i
its payment.
3. The mechanism informs the agents of the outcome g(θ), and asks each agent to pay
the amount pi(θ).
A VCG mechanism is truthful with respect to traditional lying [9]. Moreover, when
a VCG mechanism is used with an optimal algorithm, under-reporting can be easily
prevented, because under-reporting has the same effect as declaring a cost of∞ for the
parts that an agent cannot or does not want to execute.
Proposition 1. A VCG mechanism is truthful with respect to any combination of under-
reporting and traditional lying.
A basic VCG mechanism creates incentives for agents to declare their types truth-
fully, assuming that the selected outcome can really be obtained. However, when one
or more agents are over-reporting, these same incentives turn out to be insufficient to
guarantee truthfulness.
Lemma 1. A VCG mechanism is not truthful with respect to over-reporting, and the
gain by over-reporting can be arbitrarily large.
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Proof. A simple example suffices. Suppose that in a multiagent planning problem,
agent 1 has a goal t1 to achieve, which requires actions a1 and a2 with precedence
relation a1 ≺ a2 (i.e., a1 has to be executed before a2). In addition, once action a1
has been done, agent 2’s goal t2 can be attained. Agent 1 itself is able to perform only
action a1, with cost 0. The reward for achieving goal t1 is β1 > 0 and of achieving goal
t2 is β2 > 0.
Suppose that both agents truthfully declare their types. The outcome ω specifies
executing action a1 and thus t2 can be achieved. Then e(ω, θ) = ω, and the payment of
agent 2 is: p2(θ) = h2(θ−2), and thus its utility is:
u2(ω, θ2) = v2(ω, θ2)− p2(θ) = β2 − h2(θ−2)
Suppose now that agent 2 over-reports that it is able to execute action a2, with cost
0. With this declaration θˆ, the outcome ωˆ specifies executing a1 and then a2, and thus
achieving both t2 and t1. The payment of agent 2 is then given by p2(θˆ) = h2(θ−2) −
β1. However, since action a2 cannot be executed, we know that e(ωˆ, θ) 6= ωˆ. In this
example, the outcome that can really be achieved is ω, i.e., e(ωˆ, θ) = ω. Agent 2’s
utility in this case thus is
u2(e(ωˆ, θˆ), θ2) = v2(ω, θ2)− p2(θˆ) = β2 − h2(θ−2) + β1.
So, we have u2(e(ωˆ, θˆ), θ2) − u2(ω, θ2) = β1 > 0. Agent 2 can increase its util-
ity by over-reporting. This example also shows that the gain by over-reporting can be
arbitrarily large, depending on the reward of the goal (t1) by the other agent.
Another property we would like a mechanism to have besides truthfulness, is that
agents should not get a negative utility by participating. A mechanism is usually called
individually rational (or IR) if agents never receive negative utility in equilibrium [8,
11]. The equilibrium strategies that we aim for in this paper are truthtelling. Hence, it is
straightforward to see that if all agents are following this strategy, the VCG-mechanism
is individually rational.
In this paper, however, we would like agents to also have a nonnegative utility guar-
anteed in case other agents are not truthful, specifically since part of the execution may
then fail. We call mechanisms for which this holds strongly individually rational. In
earlier work this same concept has been referred to as a participation constraint [9].
Definition 7. A mechanism is strongly individually rational (sIR) if for every agent i,
for every type profile θˆ = (θ, θˆ−i) where agent i is following the equilibrium strategy
(i.e., i is truthful), the utility of agent i is non-negative, i.e., ui(e(g(θˆ), θi)) ≥ 0.
We now show that when an agent is over-reporting, the mechanism is not strongly
individually rational anymore, because other agents may end up with a negative utility.
We show this by the following multiagent planning problem called MAP(β) which can
be defined for any value β > 0.
Example 2. This example is a generalization of Example 1. We consider a setting with
two agents, where agent 1 has a goal t1 which requires actions a1 and a2, and where
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these actions have a precedence relation a1 ≺ a2. However, in this problem the reward
for achieving goal t1 is β+2. Agent 1 itself is able to perform only action a1, with cost
β. Agent 2 claims that it can execute action a2, with cost 1.
The type declaration of agent 1 is: θ1, consisting of t1 with reward β+2 and action
a1 with cost β. The declaration of agent 2 is: θ2, consisting of action a2 with cost 1.
Based on these declarations, any VCG mechanism computes an optimal outcome ω
where goal t1 can be achieved by letting agent 1 execute action a1, and then asking
agent 2 to do action a2. The social welfare of this outcome is then 1. In addition, a
VCG mechanism computes the payments of both agents as follows. The payment of
agent 1 is h1(θ2)− (−1), i.e., agent 1 needs to pay 1 plus some function of θ2, and the
payment of agent 2 is h2(θ1)− (β+2−β), i.e, agent 2 receives 2 minus some function
of θ1.
Lemma 2. A VCG mechanism is not strongly individually rational with respect to over-
reporting.
Proof. Suppose that in the example above, agent 2 actually over-reported its type—it is
not able or not willing to do action a2. In this case we end up in an outcome ω′ where
only action a1 has been executed. The valuation v1(ω′, θ1) of this outcome for agent 1
is then based only on the cost of this action, i.e., −β. Since a VCG mechanism is used,
the utility of agent 1 is then −β − h1(θ2)− 1. Since h1 depends only on θ2 and not on
β, no matter which function h1 a VCG mechanism uses, we can construct an example
by taking β > −h1(θ2) − 1 where the utility for agent 1 is negative. Thus, the VCG
mechanism is not individually rational with respect to over-reporting.
The following theorem immediately follows from the two lemmas above (Lemma 1
and Lemma 2).
Theorem 1. A VCG mechanism is not strongly individually rational nor truthful with
respect to over-reporting.
Consequently, over-reporting can destroy truthfulness. This seems to be because
the resulting outcome is infeasible. It is therefore interesting to know, for the purpose
of detecting, whether there exist situations where an agent over-reports to improve its
utility, but the mechanism chooses a feasible outcome. This turns out to be impossible
in every situation where there is an incentive for the agent to do so.
Proposition 2. Given a VCG mechanism and a type profile θ ∈ Θ, if an agent i has
an incentive to over-report when other agents are truthful, then the outcome g(θˆ) (with
θˆ = (θˆi, θ−i)) is infeasible.
Proof. We show this result by contraposition.
Let ω = argmaxω∈F (θ) v(ω, θ) and let ω′ = g(θˆ). Assume ω′ is a feasible out-
come, i.e., ω′ is also inF (θ). Hence, we have e(ω′, θ) = ω′. It also holds that vi(ω′, θi) =
vi(ω′, θˆi), since agent i is over-reporting. The difference δ of the utility of agent i of the
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two outcomes ω and ω′ is then given by
δ = ui(ω, θ)− ui(ω′, θˆ)
= vi(ω, θi)− pi(θ)− (vi(ω′, θi)− pi(θˆ))
= v(ω, θ)− hi(θ−i)−(
v(ω′, θˆ)− hi(θ−i) + vi(ω′, θi)− vi(ω′, θˆi)
)
= v(ω, θ)− v(ω′, θˆ).
Since ω is the best feasible outcome, δ ≥ 0. So, agent i will not gain more utility by
over-reporting.
The consequence of this result is that if an agent over-reports, this can in principle
always be detected, since the selected outcome is infeasible. This leads us to the main
idea presented in the next section. If an over-reporting agent is detected, we can give
this agent a penalty, and thus hopefully restore truthfulness.
4 Conditional payments
From the previous section we have seen that no VCG mechanism is truthful or individu-
ally rational with respect to over-reporting. One reason that an agent i may over-report
is that i could receive some large payment by doing so. It seems that a straightforward
solution to this problem is to hand over the payments to agents after execution like what
Nisan and Ronen did in [9]. Unfortunately, this does not always solve the problem of
the loss of individual rationality. Imagine in a MAP instance, the execution of the com-
puted plan fails due to agent i’s over-reporting. Even if i does not receive any payment
from the mechanism after execution, some other agents may still lose money since they
execute very costly actions but their goals are not achieved. If the mechanism is not able
to compensate these agents, due to its limited budget, the agents will receive a negative
utility.
Therefore, in this section we propose to extend the payment structure in the follow-
ing two ways:
1. we ask for deposits from agents in advance, and then place a (high) penalty on
agents that turn out to be lying by not returning their deposits, and
2. we compensate agents that have become a victim of such lying agents.
We keep the VCG payment in the extended payment structure in order to deal with
situations where there are no over-reporting agents. In the following we present this
extension by introducing two additional payment functions (dep and comp), but they
can also be seen as part of just one (much more complicated) payment function.
Definition 8. A conditional-VCG mechanism, defined by
(g, (p1, . . . , pn), (dep1, . . . , depn), (comp1, . . . , compn)), works as follows:
1. The mechanism asks the agents to declare their types θi.
2. The mechanism then asks each agent i to pay an amount (depi : Θ → R+) as a
deposit.
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3. The mechanism finds an outcome using the function g taking into account only the
agents who have paid the deposit.
4. Each agent i pays the amount according to the VCG payment pi computed by the
mechanism.
5. The mechanism informs the agents of the outcome g(θ), and each agent i executes
its part.
6. If any part of the execution fails due to the agent i’s declaration, agent i will not
get its deposit back. All other agents are returned their deposits depj(θ), as well
as an amount as a compensation depending on the resulting outcome after failure
(compj : Ω ×Θ → R+).
If the execution is done successfully, we know there has not been any problem due
to over-reporting, so the normal VCG payments apply. In this case, the compensations
to all agents should be 0. The mechanism proposed here is similar to the mechanism
for task scheduling with verification [9], except for a number of differences. For exam-
ple, we do not assume that payments can always be enforced, but we have the deposit
instead. The main difference, however, is that this mechanism is general for all kinds of
problems. All results in this section hold for this general setting.
A conditional-VCG mechanism is called truthful if it is a dominant strategy for
agents to declare their true types, no matter what other agents declare, and regardless of
the state after the execution.
Definition 9. A conditional-VCG mechanism (g, p, dep, comp) is truthful if for any
agent i with type θi ∈ Θi, any true or mis-reporting type profile θ−i ∈ Θ−i, for all
types θˆi 6= θi, it holds that
(1) if lying of i is detected, then
vi(e(g(θ), θ), θi)− pi(θ) + compi(g(θ), θ)
≥ vi(e(g(θˆ), θ), θi)− pi(θˆ)− depi(θˆ)
(2) and otherwise
vi(e(g(θ), θ), θi)− pi(θ) + compi(g(θ), θ)
≥ vi(e(g(θˆ), θ), θi)− pi(θˆ) + compi(g(θˆ), θˆ).
In item (1) of the above definition, the left hand of the inequality specifies the utility
of i when it is truthful, where the mechanism returns the deposit to i, together with
some compensation in case other agents incur an infeasible outcome. The right hand
of the inequality shows that when agent i’s lying is detected, the deposit will not be
returned to it. Moreover, it will not receive any compensation. In item (2), if agent i
lies and its lying is not detected, the mechanism will return it its deposit, together with
some compensation.
From Definition 9, it becomes clear that the incentives of agents relate to the pay-
ments, the deposits, the compensations, and moreover, whether or not the lying (over-,
under-reporting, traditional forms of lying) agents can be caught. We now examine the
influence of these parameters on truthfulness and individual rationality.
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4.1 Truthfulness in dominant strategies
Since on successful execution the separate deposit stage does not enlarge the strategy
space of the agents, it is straightforward to see that if the agents are truthful under
the VCG mechanism, they will not be better off by lying under the conditional-VCG
mechanism either.
Proposition 3. A conditional-VCG mechanism is truthful in all settings where the VCG
mechanism is truthful.
Consequently, conditional-VCG is truthful with respect to traditional lying, under-
reporting, and in addition, any combination. Separetely, we can show that it can prevent
over-reporting as long as all over-reporting agents can be detected.
Proposition 4. The conditional-VCG mechanism is truthful with respect to (only) over-
reporting when all over-reporting agents can be detected.
Proof. From Proposition 2, we know that agent i has an incentive to over-report only if
the resulting outcome is infeasible. Suppose an infeasible outcome ω′ is generated due
to i’s declaration θˆi. Agent i will then be caught by the mechanism during the execution
stage, since all over-reporting agents can be detected. Given that a significantly large
deposit was placed, agent i’s utility when declaring θˆi is not higher than that of being
truthful (item (1) in Definition 9). Therefore, agent i is never worse off by truth-telling.
This holds for any agent in the system.
In some problem domains this condition that all over-reporting agents can be de-
tected can easily be satisfied. For instance, in a combinatorial exchange, all agents have
to pass their promised resources simultaneously. Therefore, every over-reporting agent
can be detected during the execution phase.
Proposition 4 also relies on the fact that the deposit depi that was placed is big
enough. To ensure truthfulness, the deposit depi should be at least the difference be-
tween the utility of the best outcome that an agent i could have and the worst outcome
that it may get. This way agent i can never be better off by losing the deposit, and thus
it does not have an incentive to lie. We now show how to establish a lower bound on the
deposit for a multiagent planning problem.
Example 3. Suppose that if every agent declares its true type, no goal can be attained.
That is, the plan is empty. However, one agent i claims it can help to achieve the de-
clared goals of all other agents G by using its actions Oi. The mechanism computes an
(infeasible) outcome ω′, where actionsOi are planned to achieve goalsG. According to
the declaration of agent i, the best outcome for i is ω′ as agent i can receive a maximal
utility of the total reward r(G) of all goals G. In addition, the worst outcome for i is the
empty plan with utility 0. Thus, the minimal deposit depi for agent i is r(G).
So given such a large enough deposit, being able to detect all over-reporting agents
is sufficient to prevent all agents from over-reporting. Unfortunately, we can show that if
at the same time another agent imisreports, this cannot be detected. This result depends
on the properties a truthful mechanism should have. In the remainder of this section we
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give an example problem where having all these properties lead to a contradiction. To
arrive at this result, we first show that if a conditional-VCG mechanism is truthful, then
the compensation to each agent must be independent of its declaration.
Proposition 5. If a conditional-VCG mechanism is truthful, then the compensation
compi to agent i does not depend on this agent’s declaration θi.
More specifically, given a type profile θ−i ∈ Θ−i, for all possible declarations θˆi of
agent i, if g(θˆi, θ−i) = ω, then compi(e(ω, θ), θ) = compω , where compω is a fixed
(positive) value.
Proof. Let θi and θˆi be the true type and a lying type of agent i. Given θ−i, denote
θ = (θi, θ−i) and θˆ = (θˆi, θ−i).
We show this by contraposition. Suppose that the compensation depends on an
agent’s own declaration. Furthermore, let there be a setting where the two declarations
of i result in a same outcome, i.e, g(θ) = g(θˆ) = ω. Since the payments pi are com-
puted based on VCG, it holds that given the same outcome ω, pi(θ) = pi(θˆ) = pω .
Let ω′ denote the outcome that is the result of a failed execution of outcome ω, i.e.,
ω′ = e(ω, θ). Notice that the outcome ω′ is same for the situation of declaring θi or θˆi.
Now assume that declaring θi and θˆi have different compensations. Without loss of
generality, let compi(ω′, θˆ) > compi(ω′, θ). Agent i is not caught by the mechanism
as a lying agent, and thus its utilities when declaring θi and θˆi are given by
ui(ω′, θi) = vi(ω′, θi)− pω + compi(ω′, θ)
and
ui(ω′, θˆi) = vi(ω′, θi)− pω + compi(ω′, θˆ)
Therefore, it holds that
ui(ω′, θˆi)− ui(ω′, θi) = compi(ω′, θˆ)− compi(ω′, θ) > 0
So agent i with type θi can increase its utility by declaring θˆi, and the mechanism is
thus not truthful.
Given this characterisation of the compensation function, the following proposition
says that conditional-VCG cannot prevent under-reporting or traditional lying anymore
when there are one or more over-reporting agents.
Proposition 6. If there are one or more over-reporting agents, conditional-VCG cannot
prevent other types of mis-reporting, even if all over-reporting agents can be detected.
We use an example to present a such setting.
Proof. We consider two related multiagent planning problems with three agents. Agent
1 has two goals: (1) t1 requires actions a1 and a2 and a3, with a precedence relation
a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3, (2) t′1 requires actions a′1 and a3, with a precedence relation a′1 ≺ a3.
Agent 2 can execute a2, and agent 3 can execute a3 but only once. Therefore, given
these two goals, there are two possible (non-empty) outcomes (plans):
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– ω1: achieve goal t′1 by executing action a′1 and then a3; and
– ω2: achieve goal t1 by executing actions a1, a2, and then a3.
Among these, the mechanism selects the outcome that has the highest social welfare,
based on the declaration of agents.
Suppose that all over-reporting agents can be detected. In the first problem instance,
the true and declared types of three agents are shown in Table 1. We see that agents
2 and 3 over-report non-existing actions a2 and a3. Thus both two outcomes ω1 and
ω2 are infeasible. That is, if ω1 is chosen, the execution will be stopped after agent 1
executes a′1 due to the failure of agent 3 on executing a3, and agent 3 is caught. If ω2
is chosen, the execution will be stopped after agent 1 executes a1 due to the failure of
agent 2 on executing a2. As a result, agent 2 is caught. Agent 1 will not be caught as a
lying agent in both cases because it is able to execute the actions that it promised, i.e., no
infeasible outcome generated by it. Consequently, it will receive some compensation.
According to Proposition 8, we know that the compensation to agent i has to be a fixed
value given θ−i and a same outcome. Let the compensations for the outcomes e(ω1, θ)
and e(ω2, θ) for agent 1 be compω1 and compω2 , respectively.
Given the declarations of agent 2 and 3 as shown in the table 1, we compare the
utility of agent 1 when it is truthful (thus the outcome is ω1) and when it is under-
reporting (thus the outcome is ω2):
u1(ω1, θ1) = vi(e(ω1, θ), θ1)− pi(θ) + comp1(ω1, θ)
= −(β + 1)− (h1(θ−1)− v(ω1, θ) + v1(ω1, θ1))
+compω1
= −(β + 1)− (h1(θ−1)− 0) + compω1
= −β − 1− h1(θ−1) + compω1
u1(ω2, θˆ1) = vi(e(ω2, θ), θ1)− pi(θˆ) + comp1(ω2, θˆ)
= −β − (h1(θ−1)− v(ω2, θˆ) + v1(ω2, θˆ1))
+compω2
= −β − (h1(θ−1)− 1) + compω2
= −β − 1− h1(θ−1) + compω2
To ensure that agent 1 is truthful, we need to have u1(ω1, θ1) ≥ u1(ω2, θˆ1). Thus it
follows that compω1 ≥ compω2 .
i true type θi declared type θˆi
1 a1 with cost β, a′1 with cost β + 1, a1 with cost β, a
′
1 with cost β + 1,
t1 with reward β + 2, t1 with reward β + 2
t′1 with reward β + 3
2 ∅ a2 with cost 1
3 ∅ a3 with cost 0
Table 1. Case 1: When agent 1 under-reports by not declaring its goal t′1, the resulting plan is ω2, with a value of β + 2−
1− β = 1. If agent 1 declares truthfully, the resulting plan is ω1 with a value of β + 3− β − 1 = 2.
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i true type θi declared type θˆi
1 a1 with cost β, a′1 with cost β, a1 with cost β, a
′
1 with cost β,
t1 with reward β + 2, t1 with reward β + 2,
t′1 with reward β t
′
1 with reward β + 2
2 ∅ a2 with cost 1
3 ∅ a3 with cost 0
Table 2. Case 2: When agent 1 lies about the reward of its goal t′1, the resulting plan is ω1, with a value of β+2− β = 2.
If agent 1 declares truthfully, the resulting plan is ω2 with a value of β + 2− 1− β = 1.
Consider now another problem instance with (declared) types as given in Table 2.
In this setting, we compare the utility of agent 1 when it is truthful (and the selected
outcome is ω2) to when it is under-reporting (and the outcome is ω1):
u′1(ω2, θ1) = vi(e(ω2, θ), θ1)− pi(θ) + comp1(ω2, θ)
= −β − (h1(θ−1)− 1) + compω2
= −β − 1− h1(θ−1) + compω2
u′1(ω1, θˆ1) = vi(e(ω1, θ), θ1)− pi(θˆ) + comp1(ω1, θˆ)
= −β − (h1(θ−1)− 0) + compω1
= −β − h1(θ−1) + compω1
To ensure give agent 1 an incentive to be truthful in this setting, we need that u′1(ω2, θ1) ≥
u′1(ω1, θˆ1). Thus it follows that compω2 ≥ compω1+1. From Case 1, we have compω1 ≥
compω2 . Clearly we cannot define comp such that conditional-VCG is truthful in both
cases.
In other words, even if all over-reporting agents can be detected, conditional-VCG is
not truthful. Only when all agents can be verified during the execution stage, conditional-
VCG is truthful, because all lying agents will be caught by the mechanism. Thus a lying
agent iwill not get its deposit back from the mechanism. Given that a significantly large
deposit was placed, agent i’s utility when declaring θˆi is not higher than that of being
truthful. Therefore, agent i is never worse off by truth-telling. This holds for any agent
in the system.
Lemma 3. The conditional-VCG mechanism is truthful if and only if the execution of
all agents can be verified.
This result is the generalized version of Nisan and Ronen’s result on task scheduling
with verification [9]. In this domain agents’ declarations are the execution times for
certain jobs. Assuming that agents will not delay such executions on purpose, we can
verify the types of all agents regarding the scheduled jobs during the execution of the
schedule.
In the remainder of this paper we show that this mechanism is truthful in a Nash
equilibrium without such a strong assumption.
4.2 Truthfulness in a Nash equilibrium
The condition in Lemma 3 that the execution of all agents can be verified is a strong
assumption. Often in many multiagent applications, it is impossible to detect every sin-
gle mis-reporting during execution, especially imagining the cases that in a single shot
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game, an agent may only participate once in the mechanism, and thus it is impossible
to verify whether this agent under-reports its type.
Therefore, we wonder, without the assumption given in Lemma 3, whether it is
possible for the conditional-VCG mechanism to obtain the truthfulness in a weaker
notion, i.e., truthful in a Nash equilibrium. Notice that even this weaker notion does not
hold for the original VCG mechanism.
Proposition 7. A VCG mechanism is not truthful with respect to over-reporting even in
a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is simple, by observing the example in the proof of Lemma 1, where when
agent 1 is truthful, agent 2 is still better off by over-reporting.
Fortunately, for the conditional-VCG mechanism, we can show that it is best for
each agent to report its true type, provided that others are also doing so.
Lemma 4. The conditional-VCG mechanism is truthful in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume all other agents are reporting their true types. Suppose agent i has an in-
centive to over-report. This will thus cause an infeasible outcome (with Proposition 2).
In the execution stage, agent i will be thus easily detected, and therefore lose its de-
posit. Assume this deposit is large enough, agent i will not receive higher utility by
over-reporting.
Both under-reporting and traditional lying will also never lead to a higher utility
with Proposition 1. When the mis-reporting of agent i combines over-reporting and
other two lying types, an infeasible outcome will also be chosen (with Proposition 2).
Thus agent i will be caught, and will not receive higher utility by doing so.
After these results on the truthfulness of conditional-VCG, we now study whether
we can guarantee each truthful agent a nonnegative utility.
4.3 Strongly individual rationality
It is clear that when all agents are truth-telling, the mechanism is strongly individually
rational, since the payments are computed by the VCG formula. However, when the
execution is not completely successful, an agent’s utility without compensation may
become negative, even when itself has declared its true type. We have shown this in the
proof of Lemma 2 in Section 3. Therefore, any agent who is not caught by the mecha-
nism as a lying agent, should be given some compensation to guarantee its utility to be
nonnegative. We first restate the definition of strong individual rationality (Definition 7)
specifically for the conditional-VCG mechanism.
Definition 10. A conditional VCG mechanism (g, p, dep, comp) is strongly individu-
ally rational (sIR) if for any agent i with true type θi ∈ Θi, for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i, and for
any θˆ−i 6= θ−i it holds that
vi(e(g(θˆ), θ), θi)− pi(θˆ) + compi(g(θˆ), θˆ) ≥ 0,
where θˆ = (θi, θˆ−i).
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We now show the minimal compensation that the mechanism should give to the
(truthful) agents in order to maintain strong individual rationality.
Proposition 8. Given the declaration of the agents θˆ and the outcome ω = g(θˆ), the
compensation compi that a strongly individually rational conditional-VCG mechanism
needs to give to each agent i that is not lying is at least pi(θˆ)− vi(e(ω, θ), θi).
Proof. Let ω′ denote the outcome that is the result of a failed execution of outcome ω,
i.e., ω′ = e(ω, θ). An agent i that is not lying gets its deposit back from the mechanism,
and its utility is then given by
ui(ω′, θi) = vi(ω′, θi)− pi(θˆ) + compi(ω′, θˆ).
It is not hard to see that in order for ui(ω′, θi) ≥ 0, the minimal compensation the
mechanism needs to pay to the agent depends on the payment that the agent received
before execution, and its valuation on the partially executed outcome.
compi(ω
′, θˆ) ≥ pi(θˆ)− vi(ω′, θi).
We would like to guarantee a nonnegative utility for any truthful agent, even when
other agents are not, and at the same time we would like to have a truthful mechanism.
Theorem 2. The conditional-VCG mechanism with compensation function defined in
Proposition 8 is both strongly individually rational and truthful if and only if the execu-
tion of all agents can be verified.
Proof. From right to left we get truthfulness immediately from Lemma 3. For a truthful
agent we can ensure that the compensation is always sufficient according to Proposi-
tion 8, so strongly individual rationality follows.
From left to right we prove by contraposition. Assume that there is a situation with
an agent that is lying and the mechanism does not detect this.Then by Lemma 3 the
mechanism cannot be truthful.
For the situations where it is impossible to verify all agents during execution, we
present the following result.
Theorem 3. The conditional-VCG mechanism with compensation function defined in
Proposition 8 is truthful and strongly individual rational in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 4 that truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium strategy
for agents. For a truthful agent, we can ensure that its utility is non-negative given the
compensation defined in Proposition 8.
5 Related work
The failure of VCG to handle over-reporting has been mentioned before in the context of
a task scheduling problem [9], a task allocation domain [4], and a multiagent planning
problem [12]. Two different methods have been proposed to deal with this problem.
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A deposit has been proposed in [12], and an extension of VCG called mechanism by
verification has been proposed by Nisan and Ronen [9].
As we have already mentioned in Section 1, our work is similar to the latter ap-
proach [9], as we both address the need of handling the incentives not only in the decla-
ration phase, but also in the actual execution phase. Nisan and Ronen [9] show that their
mechanism for task scheduling is truthful, which they called implementable with verifi-
cation if there exists a payment that ensures any agent is better off by reporting its type
correctly. However, their mechanism solely depends on the assumption of full verifica-
tion, that is, all declared information that is used in the outcome can be verified during
execution, no matter whether the execution is successful or not. There is no discussion
in their work on what properties a mechanism can have when such a strong assump-
tion does not hold. It is also not clear whether it is possible to apply their mechanism
to other problem domains other than task scheduling. In this paper we formalized the
idea of a deposit from [12], generalized this to any problem domain, and extended it by
having also a compensation. We proved that our mechanism is truthful and (strongly)
individual rational in Nash without the requirement of being able to verify each agent.
We just need to be able to detect the (over-reporting) agent that has caused the unsuc-
cessfully termination. We believe that this mechanism can thus be applied to a broader
set of problem domains.
Auletta et al. [1, 2] are also interested in characterizing social choice functions
which are implementable with verification. They show that the famous weak mono-
tonicity condition [8] is not always a sufficient condition of truthfulness for a mech-
anism with verification. The mechanism with verification studied in [2] is not able
to detect every form of misreporting. For instance, in the task scheduling problem, an
agent may report to be slower than it actually is. They do not consider such types of
misreporting, which have lower valuations than truth-telling. In this paper we have seen
that a combination of different types of mis-reporting can lead to problems, even when
the mechanism is truthful with respect to any one of them separately. It would be inter-
esting to see if such a combination could make any difference for their results.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
When the agents in a multiagent system are self-interested and rational they may try to
manipulate the outcome of the system in their favor. Most work in mechanism design
assumes that agents can only lie about the valuation they have for certain outcomes,
but in real systems agents may also lie about their capabilities or refuse to execute their
part to reach a certain outcome. We have proved that VCG is not truthful (not even in
Nash) nor strongly individual rational in such domains where the execution of a selected
outcome can fail.
We then presented an extension of VCG, conditional-VCG, that can deal with such
settings. This (direct) mechanism has a conditional payment after an outcome has been
achieved. If this outcome turns out to be different from the outcome selected by the
mechanism, at least one of the agents failed to execute its part of the outcome. We
showed that this mechanism has the following properties.
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1. If and only if the execution of all agents can be verified, conditional-VCG is incen-
tive compatible in dominant strategies and strongly individually rational.
2. When at most one failure on the execution can be detected, conditional-VCG is
incentive compatible in Nash and strongly individually rational.
These results indicate a partitioning of mechanism design problems into three cate-
gories.
– When there is no possibility of a failed execution due to rational misbehavior of
agents, traditional VCG mechanisms can be used.
– When execution can fail due to misreporting agents, or agents that refuse to execute
part of an outcome, and when all such misbehaving agents can be detected during
execution, conditional-VCG can be used. It guarantees a dominant strategy and a
nonnegative utility for all other truthful agents. This applies for example to the task
scheduling domain with verification.
– Finally, when execution may fail and at least one such misbehaving agent can be de-
tected, conditional-VCG guarantees a nonnegative utility for all truthtelling agents,
and is incentive compatible in a Nash equilibrium. This is for example the case in
a multiagent planning domain, but also in other domains with dependencies of one
agent upon another in execution, like scheduling with precedences.
This categorization gives an indication of what kind of results can be expected in a
given domain.
To continue this line of work, we would like to study (i) the influence of using non-
optimal algorithms on the properties of the proposed conditional-VCG mechanism [10],
and (ii) to see whether the weak monotonicity condition [8] together with a condition
like monitoring is sufficient for truthfulness.
Another interesting topic is to find bounds on the depoit. In Example 3 we gave a
lower bound on the deposit to ensure truthfulness for MAP, but suppose that we also
want the collected deposit to be sufficient to cover all compensations to the other (truth-
ful) agents. Is it posible then to define a deposit function such that deposit-VCG is both
(weakly) budget balance and individually rational?
Finally, we would like to study settings with infeasible outcomes in online mecha-
nisms. We conjecture that a payment in each step of the execution is sufficient to allow
for a mechanism that is incentive compatible in dominant strategies, instead of one that
is incentive compatible in Nash as holds for the one-shot mechanisms in this paper.
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